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Abstract 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This paper examines the influence of corporate governance on risk 
disclosure practices in the UK and Italy and also studies the impact of those practices on market 
liquidity. co_823 3.24 
Research Findings/Insights: We find that governance factors principally influence the 
decisions of UK (Italian) firms over whether to exhibit risk information voluntarily (mandatorily) 
in their annual report narratives. When we distinguish between firms with strong and weak 
governance (in terms of board efficiency) in each country, we find that the factors that affect 
mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure appear to be driven more by strongly governed firms in 
both countries. Furthermore, in the UK, we find that voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure 
improves market liquidity significantly by reducing information asymmetry. Moreover, strongly 
governed firms in the UK tend to provide more meaningful risk information to their investors 
than weakly governed firms. In Italy, however, we find that strongly rather than weakly governed 
firms exhibiting risk information voluntarily rather than mandatorily improves market liquidity 
significantly.  
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper emphasizes the importance of distinguishing 
between mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure when studying the impact of corporate 
governance. Our findings differ across strongly and weakly governed firms, in terms of both the 
factors that influence risk disclosure practices and the exact informativeness of those practices. 
Furthermore, the findings support the view that disclosing risk information in the narrative 
sections of annual reports is seen as more credible in the UK than in Italy as such information is 
likely to be more strongly related to investors’ price decisions in the UK than in Italy.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The results support the current regulatory trend in risk 
reporting within the UK that emphasizes the importance of directors and encourages rather than 
mandates risk disclosure. However, the results generally signal a need for further improvements in 
the Italian context. Our evidence also supports the value of the confidence in the UK governance 
system, compared to that in Italy, which motivates British firms to provide highly informative risk 
information more often than Italian firms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A significant body of literature demonstrates that the monitoring function of corporate governance 
significantly influences the propensity for better disclosure (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Sloan, 2001; 
Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Whalen, 2007; Lim, Matolcsy, & Chow, 2007; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). 
However, little work has either examined the relationship between risk reporting and corporate 
governance or studied how risk information influences market liquidity. Studying how corporate 
governance influences a firm’s decision over whether to provide risk information is becoming 
increasingly important since this information might be useful for investors seeking to reduce 
information uncertainty by enabling them to estimate an appropriate discount rate to use in their 
valuation models (e.g., Miihkinen, 2013). Investors might incorporate risk information into their 
price decisions and thus improve the market liquidity by reducing information asymmetry (e.g., 
Campbell et al., 2014). Furthermore, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) theorize that, if a firm 
chooses not to disclose risk information, it will have a higher risk premium than firms providing 
such information, and that premium is likely to be higher in the presence of mandatory risk 
disclosure than voluntary risk disclosure. 
While the relevant UK literature focuses on investigating the impact of either firm 
characteristics (e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2006) or ownership and board characteristics (e.g., Abraham 
& Cox, 2007) on aggregated risk disclosure, the relevant Italian literature (e.g., Beretta & Bozzolan, 
2004) studies the impact of certain firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and industry type) on the 
quantity and quality of aggregated risk disclosure. Rather than relying principally on aggregated 
risk disclosure, our paper distinguishes between mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure since 
there is a large body of accounting literature that has emerged from Dye (1986, 1990), such as 
Gigler and Hemmer (1998), Einhorn (2005), Bagnoli and Watts (2007), and Butler, Kraft, and 
Weiss (2007), showing that increasing attention is being given to the importance of distinguishing 
between the two forms of disclosure as each has different underlying incentives. Similarly, 
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Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) and (2012) theorize as to how mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure impact differently on the market indicators (e.g., market liquidity). The most recent 
research on the usefulness of risk disclosure suggests that investors incorporate risk information 
in a way that either affects their perceived risk (Kravet & Muslu, 2013) or influences decisions on 
stock prices by improving market liquidity (Miihkinen, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014).  
Despite the importance of this distinction that has been highlighted by the above-mentioned 
theoretical research, empirical research on risk disclosure (e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham 
& Cox, 2007; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014) neither distinguishes mandatory from 
voluntary risk disclosure in observing the factors that influence that disclosure, observes how 
corporate governance influences the observed risk disclosure practices over time, nor observes the 
usefulness of each form of risk disclosure. Additionally and more importantly, prior research does 
not examine the extent to which observed usefulness (i.e., market liquidity) is conditional on the 
strength of a firm’s corporate governance. 
Our paper addresses this gap by studying the following two questions: (1) whether, and if so 
how, corporate governance characteristics, including board size, non-executive directors, independent non-executive 
directors, duality of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman, dividend-yield, concentrated ownership structure, 
and audit quality, influence mandatory and voluntary corporate risk disclosure in the UK and Italy; (2) the extent 
to which risk information – either mandatorily and/or voluntarily provided – reduces information asymmetry, by 
improving the market liquidity between market participants in each country. 
In this paper, mandatory risk disclosure is taken to mean risk information that firms exhibit 
within, or in excess of but still related to, the risk regulations (under International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and Italian 
GAAP) that set the minimum requirements. We define voluntary risk disclosure as any other 
information about risk appearing in the narrative sections of corporate annual reports. Both types 
of risk disclosure are measured by the number of sentences providing risk information, calculated 
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using automated textual content analysis, which is increasingly being employed in the accounting 
and finance literature (Li, 2010a, 2010b; Kearney & Liu, 2014).  
Our paper contributes to the prior literature calling for a multi-country study of corporate 
governance characteristics (e.g., Judge, 2011) as such multi-element measures of corporate 
governance are an appropriate means of capturing corporate governance effectiveness (e.g., 
Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). It also contributes to the strand of research calling for the 
investigation of risk reporting incentives across countries (e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Dobler, 
2008). The prior literature on cross-national comparison (e.g., Gordon et al., 2013; Moscariello, 
Skerratt, & Pizzo, 2014) emphasizes the importance of the underlying differences in cultural, 
economic and institutional circumstances when investigating factors that influence accounting 
practices. The extant evidence on cross-country risk reporting (Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011; 
Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2014) emphasizes the importance of observing differences in 
risk reporting practices and investigating the specific factors that explain such variation. Neither 
Dobler, Lajili, and Zéghal (2011) nor Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2014), however, 
investigate how corporate governance influences risk reporting practices.  
The comparison of the influence of corporate governance on risk reporting practices 
between the UK and Italy is useful since the two are widely seen as representative of contrasting 
models of European culture and economic and regulatory milieus (Cooke & Wallace, 1990; Nobes, 
1998; Nobes & Parker, 2010). In particular, these two countries offer unique sets of characteristics 
and have very different legal origins, the UK having a strong common-law tradition, and Italy one 
of civil law. Further differences in institutional settings include the large stock market, dispersed 
corporate ownership, high level of investor protection and strong legal enforcement in the UK 
compared with a less developed stock market, concentrated ownership, low level of investor rights 
and weak legal enforcement in Italy (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). 
According to Ball, Kothari, and Ashok (2000), in common-law countries the shareholders alone 
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elect the members of the governing board, payouts are less closely linked to current-period 
accounting income and disclosure is a more likely solution to the information asymmetry problem. 
Our findings suggest that the influence of governance characteristics on risk disclosure 
practices in UK and Italian firms varies according to the strength of governance within each 
country, and also that the predominant effects are due to strongly governed firms. Furthermore, 
our findings support the idea that risk disclosure in the narrative sections of annual reports conveys 
credible information in the UK, but is less informative and can be characterized more as boilerplate 
disclosure in Italy. Our results support the UK’s current regulatory trend, which emphasizes the 
importance of directors for stimulating firms to reveal more risk information, and encouraging 
rather than mandating risk disclosure. However, the results generally signal a need for further 
improvement in the Italian context. Our evidence also supports the value of the confidence in the 
UK governance system, compared to that in Italy, which motivates UK firms to provide more 
highly informative risk information than Italian firms provide. 
The following section of the paper sets out the background to our research, synthesizes the 
prior literature and develops our hypotheses. After that we introduce the methodology. Next, we 
discuss the empirical results and the robustness checks, and the final section draws conclusions, 
discusses limitations, and suggests avenues for future research. 
 
BACKGROUND, RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The corporate governance debate has been addressed to a large extent in the UK, where several 
reports have shaped the country’s approach to corporate governance (Cadbury Report, 1992; 
ICAEW, 1999b). In 2003, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the independent body that 
regulates corporate governance and reporting, introduced the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance on the basis of the concept of “comply or explain”. It combined all previous 
institutional efforts and emphasized the weight of independent non-executive directors, the 
importance of risk management, and the significance of corporate reporting. 
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The contents of this report have been revised several times (2008, 2010 and 2012). The most 
recent version, issued in October of 2012, places greater attention on the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate reporting, requiring boards to declare that their annual reports 
and accounts are indeed “fair, balanced and understandable” (FRC, 2012). Furthermore, firms 
must guarantee that the narrative sections of their annual reports do not, in any way, conflict with 
their financial statements, and indeed that they constitute an accurate reflection of the company’s 
performance.1 Some of the key features of UK best practices can be summarized in the following 
points: (1) a unitary board with members collectively responsible for leading the company; (2) 
division of power at the top of the company, with the chairman responsible for running the board 
and the CEO responsible for running the company; (3) a balance of executive and independent 
non-executive directors; (4) periodic evaluations of the efficiency of the board and its committees.  
In terms of corporate disclosure, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the UK 
published the original version of the Operating and Financial Review (OFR) in 1993, providing 
guidance regarding narrative disclosure. Furthermore, in the UK over the last two decades, the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) has paid great attention to 
how UK firms provide information about risk (ICAEW, 1997, 1999a, 2002). All of these 
documents rely on principles-based recommendations and emphasize the importance of providing 
risk information voluntarily so as to minimize the cost of  capital. More recently, the ICAEW 
(2011) has suggested ways to improve the risk disclosure in annual reports (e.g., continuously 
considering investor needs, prioritizing voluntary over mandatory and quantitative over qualitative 
risk information, and keeping shorter and more effective lists of risks). The main features of  the 
UK approach to risk reporting are (1) that voluntary risk reporting is preferred, on the basis that 
it improves the quality of  accounting information and reduces the cost of  capital and (2) that each 
firm can identify all of  its risks individually and accurately rather than providing a list of  risk types. 
To conclude, the UK’s corporate governance emphasizes the board’s engagement with the 
shareholders and compliance with a voluntary code of best practice. This encourages high 
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standards of corporate governance behavior, and assumes a strong relationship between corporate 
governance factors and risk disclosure. 
In Italy, the debate and regulation on corporate governance have emerged more recently. 
Italy has adopted the Code of Self-Regulation, prepared by the Corporate Governance Committee 
of Borsa Italiana SpA, first issued in 1999 and amended in 2002, 2006, 2010, 2011 and 2014, which 
is based on the “comply or explain” principle. The changes in the Italian regulation highlight the 
importance of board structure and the independent directors as a means to overcome Italian 
market weaknesses such as the markedly concentrated ownership and the trend for large owners 
to expropriate minority shareholders. 
The link between corporate governance and corporate reporting is also affirmed in the 
Italian code, with specific requirements regarding disclosure in the governance recommendations. 
Moreover, in the latest version of the report, a lot of attention was placed on risk disclosure, with 
a specific appendix included to discuss the importance of risk management disclosure. This 
emphasis on risk disclosure stems from a consultative document that was issued in 2008 by the 
Council of Italian Chartered Accountants (IRDCEC, 2008) to assist entities with implementing 
the new requirements for management reporting that emerged after the introduction and 
implementation of Directive 2001/65/EC and the subsequent changes in the Civil Code of Italy 
(Legislative Decree No. 32/2007 that modified Article 2428 of the Civil Code). 2  The new 
regulation, in fact, forces firms to include a description of their risks and uncertainties in the 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of their annual report. In other words, 
managers have to explain in detail all of the risks faced by their company during the past year, and 
how they have managed these risks, in their annual reports.  
To sum up, despite these normative efforts, the Italian corporate governance regime exhibits 
low legal protection for investors and poor legal enforcement, underdeveloped equity markets and 
a very high ownership concentration. 
Relevant Literature and Research Hypotheses  
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It has been argued that corporate disclosure can be linked to a firm’s corporate governance 
structure through its inputs and/or its outputs. Specifically, the monitoring role of corporate 
governance is not only achieved through numeric accounting, but also involves corporate 
disclosure. Additionally, it is the governance structure itself that encourages a manager to adopt 
the best disclosure policy (Core, 2001; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). Further, Sloan (2001) argues 
that corporate disclosure is one of the corporate governance mechanisms employed for the 
purposes of external management oversight. 
The above studies have documented, consistent with their theoretical arguments, a 
relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure based on the latter’s role as a 
control mechanism for agency problems. The effects of corporate governance on reporting 
practice mitigate information asymmetry and improve the stewardship function. Accurate risk 
information, as an external control mechanism that reduces agency costs, is fundamental for 
shareholders, analysts and investors, enabling them to assess a company’s risk profile, estimate its 
market value and make accurate investment decisions (Rajgopal, 1999; Jorion, 2002; Kravet & 
Muslu, 2013; Miihkinen, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). 
Based on the emerging and relevant prior literature on corporate governance, corporate 
disclosure in general, and risk disclosure in particular, we will now introduce several corporate 
governance mechanisms and their possible effects on risk disclosure practices, and then we will 
look at the influence of those practices on market liquidity. Based on this, we will formulate this 
paper’s hypotheses. 
 
 
Risk Disclosure Practices and Corporate Governance  
Board size. It would appear from the significant amount of extant research that is available 
that, in cases where the board monitors the management more effectively, the quality and regularity 
of the information made known to the investors by the management does improve (Ajinkya, 
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Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). Verrecchia (2001) demonstrates that 
greater disclosure will lessen the need for research into private information. From this argument, 
it would appear that information asymmetry, generally speaking, is not as high in those firms that 
have more effective boards. 
It has been argued that board size is a key element in determining the effectiveness of a 
board of directors. On the one hand, Yermack (1996) argues that large boards are likely to be less 
effective than smaller boards at reducing agency costs. On the other hand, in firms with a higher 
ownership concentration, and where insider shareholders are strongly represented on the boards, 
larger boards do not necessarily signal a less effective governance structure (Di Pietra, Grambovas, 
Raonic, & Riccaboni, 2008). This literature supports the view that larger boards may be more 
effective in reducing actual agency costs by aligning any conflicts of interest that may occur 
between insiders and outsiders.  
Recent research has questioned the extent to which larger boards can affect levels of 
disclosure (Di Pietra, Grambovas, Raonic, & Riccaboni, 2008; Lynck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). 
Empirical research, mainly based on US data, supports this view. For instance, Hoitash, Hoitash, 
and Bedard (2009) examine the impact of board size on the level of voluntary disclosure, and 
Yermack (1996) investigates the effect of board size on firm value. In their analysis of the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) found voluntary 
disclosure to be positively related to board size. In the Italian context, Allegrini and Greco (2013) 
obtained the same result. Lynck, Netter, and Yang (2008) further maintain that insider shareholder 
representation on boards is more typical of smaller and less independent boards, a finding that ties 
in with the theory that managerial ownership and board monitoring can substitute for governing 
mechanisms. 
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that board size will be positively associated 
with the level of risk disclosure practices, as formulated in the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Firms with large boards of directors, in the UK and Italy, tend to exhibit significantly high 
levels of risk disclosure, in mandatory terms and/or when offered voluntarily.  
 
Board independence. Agency theory argues that independent directors are likely to 
mitigate agency conflicts between insiders (managers) and outsiders (shareholders), as these 
directors will have no ties with the managers or representative shareholders and should be able to 
offer truly objective opinions that benefit the company (Patelli & Prencipe, 2007). Independent 
directors may also have high incentives to increase the levels of voluntary disclosure and thus signal 
their lack of complicity with the insiders (leaders, management and strong ownership) and their 
own ability to improve their company’s market value. 
Prior research (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005) has 
examined in detail the influence of board structure on voluntary disclosure levels. These studies 
find that board composition, measured by the percentage of independent directors on a board, 
and the quality of the board of directors overall are likely to influence the amount of corporate 
information managers can manage and disclose. These studies further argue for a positive 
relationship between board composition and the level of corporate disclosure. Early evidence 
provided by Forker (1992) and based on 82 UK listed firms found a positive link between financial 
disclosure and the proportion of independent directors. 
Consistent with that evidence, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) demonstrate that voluntary 
disclosure increases with the number of non-executive directors on a board. Gul and Leung (2004) 
further find that independent directors are likely to significantly increase firms’ abilities to exhibit 
more voluntary information than other firms. More recently, Romano and Guerrini (2012) have 
found a positive correlation between mandatory disclosure and independent directors in a sample 
of Italian listed companies over the period 2002-2010. 
We follow the prior literature (e.g., Gul & Leung, 2004; Abraham & Cox, 2007; Patelli & 
Prencipe, 2007), which distinguishes between non-executive directors with business or ownership 
ties to the company and/or relationships with management (dependent non-executive directors) 
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and those without (independent non-executive directors). Therefore, we adopt the legal definition, 
which states (Gul & Leung, 2004; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007) that independent non-executives 
should (1) have no allegiance to a particular shareholder or group of shareholders; (2) not obtain 
membership of the board to protect the interests of a third party; (3) not be connected to 
management; (4) not be current or former executives of the company; (5) not have ﬁnancial or 
other interests in the business of the company or its subsidiaries. Based on the above discussion 
of the relevant theory and literature, we expect that the presence of non-executive and independent 
non-executive directors on a board will be positively related to the level of risk disclosure practices. 
The following two hypotheses are thus formulated: 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with a high proportion of non-executive directors, in the UK and Italy, tend to exhibit 
significantly high levels of risk disclosure, in mandatory terms and/or when offered voluntarily.   
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with a high proportion of independent non-executive directors, in the UK and Italy, 
tend to exhibit significantly high levels of risk disclosure, in mandatory terms and/or when offered voluntarily.  
 
CEO duality. CEO duality refers to the situation in which there is no separation between 
decision control and decision management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). It is argued that firms with 
CEO duality are likely to offer poorer disclosure (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). 
Prior research on corporate governance offers mixed results with regard to the association 
between CEO duality and disclosure. For instance, Cheng and Courtenay’s (2006) results do not 
support a significant impact of CEO duality on voluntary disclosure, while those of Li, Pike, and 
Haniffa (2008) do. 
Worrell, Nemec, and Davidson (1997) provide evidence that the stock market tends to react 
negatively to announcements of CEO duality, which would seem to support the claim that CEO 
duality has a negative effect on a board’s monitoring role. Consistent with this point, Gul and 
Leung (2004) find that CEO duality is likely to reduce the level of voluntary disclosure. Similarly, 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) find evidence that a concentration of power is negatively associated 
with both the quantity and the quality of the voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital. More 
recent research within the Italian and UK contexts supports the negative impact of concentrating 
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the power of the chairman and CEO in one person on the voluntary disclosure of general or 
forward-looking information (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Given these 
considerations, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with CEO duality, in the UK and Italy, tend to exhibit significantly low levels of risk 
disclosure, whether in mandatory terms or offered voluntarily.  
 
Dividend policy. According to agency theory, dividends may have a mitigating effect on 
agency costs through the distribution of free cash flow that a firm’s management might otherwise 
spend on unprofitable projects (Jensen, 1986). Fluck (1998) acknowledges that dividend policies 
are a way of dealing with agency problems that relate to corporate insiders and shareholders. 
Dividend payments may be viewed as a sort of risk premium that is distributed to the 
shareholders. In addition, investors who receive dividends may have less interest in information 
concerning the risks a firm is addressing. Thus, paying dividends may make up for reduced risk 
disclosure. Farinha (2003) argues that managers may pay dividends to avoid disciplinary action by 
shareholders, and he finds a positive link between company compliance with the Cadbury report’s 
“best practices” for governance, and dividend payouts in the UK.  
Similarly, the prior literature on corporate disclosure within the UK has found that firms 
with lower dividend yields are likely to provide significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosure 
(i.e., forward-looking information) than other firms (e.g., Hussainey & Walker, 2009). The 
empirical research (e.g., Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006) shows that the payouts of Italian companies 
are inversely proportionate to the voting rights of the largest company shareholder. 
The fact that firms have a choice of dividend policy suggests that high dividend payments 
are associated with less riskiness and less information asymmetry for firms. The higher are the 
dividends, the better will be the corporate governance practices of the company, thus reflecting 
the power of the minority shareholders. This discussion leads us to formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms with high payout dividends, in the UK and Italy, tend to exhibit significantly low levels 
of risk disclosure, in mandatory terms and/or when offered voluntarily. 
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Concentrated ownership structure. The fact that ownership and control are separate in 
private and public corporations leads to a problem between principal and agent, which can result 
in a less than optimal use of capital (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Wherever ownership is widely 
dispersed, the individual shareholders have practically no incentive to monitor the management. 
The marginal cost of such monitoring is often greater than the marginal benefit of the better 
performance that may result from it. 
Concentrated ownership may bring about better management control since the volume of 
the ownership stake and the incentive to monitor are positively linked. Better management control 
is likely to improve firm performance and, thus, provide benefits to the minority shareholders. 
However, there may also be costs for the minority shareholders, considering that the controlling 
owners could attempt to expropriate value from them. In a cross-country analysis, Faccio and 
Lang (2002) show that Italy has one of the lowest percentages of firms with dispersed ownership 
in Europe. Meanwhile, in a sample of 450 UK companies, Brammer and Pavelin (2006) find that 
firms showing dispersed ownership features are far more likely to disclose voluntary information 
than other firms. This knowledge leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Firms with highly concentrated ownership, in the UK and Italy, tend to exhibit significantly 
low levels of risk disclosure, in mandatory terms and/or when offered voluntarily. 
 
Audit quality. Based on agency theory, when agency costs are high, firms are likely to use 
corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure to diminish those costs. External audit 
firms can have a marked effect on the degree of voluntary information disclosed in company 
annual reports (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006). Financial statements audited by a reputable 
independent auditor may also augment the level of investor confidence, both in the firm and in its 
annual report. Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) show that the monitoring offered by an 
independent and high-quality external auditor reduces the management’s ability to engage in 
earnings management activities. In a comparative study of Dutch and UK companies, Camfferman 
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and Cooke (2002) find a positive association in the UK between voluntary disclosure and those 
firms audited by big auditing firms. This knowledge leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Firms with high audit quality, in the UK and Italy, tend to exhibit significantly high levels 
of risk disclosure, in mandatory terms and/or when offered voluntarily. 
 
Risk Disclosure Practices and Market Liquidity 
The prior literature on general disclosure (e.g., Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991) argues that increased 
disclosure reduces information asymmetry through two effects. First, increasing the accounting 
information provided to the public makes private information difficult or costly to attain. Fewer 
investors, consequently, will be able to obtain private information, which reduces the possibility of  
trading with a better-informed investor. Second, more disclosure reduces the uncertainty that 
investors might have regarding their investments.  
Collectively, both effects increase market liquidity by reducing the probability of  uninformed 
investors raising prices to protect themselves against the possibility of  making losses due to trading 
with informed investors. The bid-ask spread is a mechanism for the price of  protection when 
buying or selling shares on the market (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). Prior research supports these 
arguments, finding that high levels of  voluntary disclosure significantly improve market liquidity 
through a reduction in information asymmetry.  
Prior risk disclosure research in the US context directly measures the information content 
of  risk disclosure on the 10-K form of  the SEC filings. For example, Campbell et al. (2014) find 
that the quantity (the length) of  the risk factor (item 1.A, a compulsory requirement of  the SEC 
since 2005) is positively linked to a reduction in information asymmetry, which increases market 
liquidity (as proxied by the bid-ask spread). Consistent with these findings, Miihkinen (2013) finds 
that, in the highly regulated Finnish context, risk disclosure is negatively associated with 
information asymmetry. Neither Miihkinen (2013) nor Campbell et al. (2014), however, examines 
whether mandatory and/or voluntary risk disclosure conveys meaningful information, nor the 
extent to which such associations might differ between strongly and weakly governed firms. 
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Arguably, firms with strong boards of  directors have greater power to reveal informative details 
about firm risk to investors to reduce information asymmetry. Based on the above arguments, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: The expected negative association between the amount of  risk disclosure and information 
asymmetry, among firms in the UK and Italy, is likely to be more pronounced among strongly than weakly 
governed firms.   
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
This paper analyzes the impact of corporate governance on mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure for a sample of non-financial firms in the UK and Italy over a period of five years from 
June 2005 to June 2010. The paper also studies the impact of those practices on market liquidity. 
Following the prior literature (e.g., Marshall & Weetman, 2007), we excluded financial firms due 
to their special nature. We also excluded cross-listed firms to avoid cross-regulation effects (e.g., 
Marshall & Weetman, 2002; Abraham & Cox, 2007). The starting point of 2005 is the year in which 
the IFRS became mandatory in both countries, and the reason for ending the study in 2010 is 
based on data availability. As this study relies on the texts of annual reports, we excluded those 
annual reports that could not be converted into text files in order to ensure their readability by 
QSR(6). Our final sample consisted of 1,890 firm-year observations (290 British non-financial 
firms with 1,450 firm-year observations and 88 Italian non-financial firms with 440 firm-year 
observations). We utilized annual reports, since external investors still perceive them to be a major 
and credible source of data (e.g., Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). 
Variable Measurement 
Mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure. We used automated textual content analysis 
(e.g., Li, 2010a, 2010b; Kearney & Liu, 2014) to capture risk disclosure scores, using QSR(6). Based 
on the prior literature (Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2013), and by reading and examining 30 
randomly selected annual reports from each country, we generated a risk word list including the 
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following words: against, catastrophe (catastrophic), challenge (challenges), chance (chances), 
decline (declined), decrease (decreased), differ*, diversify*, fail (failure), fluctuate*, gain (gains), 
high*, increase (increased), less, loss*, low*, peak (peaked), probable*, reverse (reversed), risk*, 
significant*, shortage, threat, unable, uncertain (uncertainty, uncertainties) and viable. * indicates 
that we also included derivatives of the original word. The words were translated into Italian to 
generate the risk disclosure scores for the Italian firms.  
We generated aggregated risk disclosure scores for each country by counting the frequencies of 
sentences containing at least one of these risk words. Seminal research (e.g., Bowman, 1984) 
recommends using sentences rather than words as the coding unit in content analysis due to their 
greater reliability, since individual words may not indicate anything in particular. More importantly, 
and consistent with Kravet and Muslu (2013), using the sentence as the basis of coding avoids the 
problem of double-counting, as each risk sentence is scored once even if it contains more than 
one word indicating risk. 
In order to extract mandatory risk scores from the aggregated risk scores, we analyzed the risk 
regulations in both countries. We found that UK and Italian listed firms have had to follow the 
IFRS since 2005, and that the IFRS concur with both the UK and Italian GAAP regarding risk 
reporting. Despite the fact that neither the UK ASB, the Italian Accounting Committee 
(Organismo Italiano di Contabilità, OIC) nor the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) publishes an accounting standard on risk reporting, either exclusively or comprehensively, 
there are, nonetheless, several accounting standards that do require companies to provide some 
specific information about their risks.3 To accomplish our textual search, we synthesized those 
accounting standards, issued by ASB, IASB, and OIC, into six principal themes as follows: 
contingencies (FRS 12; IAS 37; OIC 19); segment reporting (SSAP 25; IAS 14 and IFRS 8; OIC 
1), foreign exchange (FRS 23; IAS 21; OIC 26); the substance of transactions or investments (FRS 
5; IAS 16; OIC 16); related party disclosures (FRS 8; IAS 24; Appendix of OIC 12); derivatives or 
financial instruments and fair value (FRS 13, 25, 26, 29; IAS 32, 39 and IFRS 7; OIC 3, 15, 20). 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Corporate Governance: An International Review, which has been published in 
final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12095/abstract]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in 
accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
17 
 
We therefore identified our final mandated word list as follows: contingencies, derivatives and/or 
financial instruments, fair value(s), foreign currency, investments and segment(s).4 
Mandatory risk disclosure was then calculated by counting the number of sentences that both 
belonged to the aggregated risk disclosure set and also contained at least one word that was related 
to the final mandated word list. Voluntary risk disclosure was the number of sentences that belonged 
to the aggregated risk disclosure set after excluding these mandatory risk disclosure sentences. In 
other words, the voluntary risk score was equal to the aggregated risk score minus the mandatory 
risk score. Appendix 1 offers examples of extracted sentences captured by QSR(6) for each type of 
disclosure.  
To check our risk disclosure scores’ validity and reliability, we compared manual and 
automated textual content analysis (Wang & Hussainey, 2013) scores to examine two issues. First, 
we examined whether there was consistency between the two methods by calculating the internal 
consistency using Cronbach’s alpha and then confirming such consistency by looking at whether 
both methods conveyed the same content using the correlation between the manual and automated 
scores for voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure. Second, we tested whether there were 
significant differences between these two methods in capturing the mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure scores using the Mann-Whitney test. To that end, we randomly selected 29 and 27 firms 
from the UK and Italy, respectively, allocated into five categories reflecting risk disclosure level, 
ranging from the lowest (from the 5% to the 25% quantile) to the highest (from the 95% to the 
100% quantile) disclosure scores. For those firms, we calculated the mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure scores manually and compared them to the scores obtained from QSR(6).5 
Our results based on Cronbach’s alpha, which provides a statistical measure of how well a 
dataset captures a particular underlying construct, confirmed a high consistency between the 
manual and automated methods in identifying and scoring risk disclosure. Specifically, these results 
showed 91% and 94.7% consistency between the manual and automated coding for the mandatory 
and voluntary risk disclosure scores, respectively. Within each country, we found very high 
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consistency between the two methods. In these analyses, the consistencies between the two 
methods were 94% (98.4%) and 87.6% (82.2%) for mandatory (voluntary) risk scores in the UK 
and Italy, respectively. All these values were acceptable when compared with the generally accepted 
social science measure of 70% (Botosan, 1997). Consistent with our previous findings, we found 
the correlation coefficient to be 0.915 (0.825) between the automated and the manual method, for 
calculating the mandatory risk disclosures in the UK (Italy), at a p-value of 0.000. For voluntary 
risk disclosure, the figure was 0.986 (0.706) in the UK (Italy). Lastly, our results, based on the 
Mann-Whitney test, confirmed the null hypothesis that the distribution of mandatory (or 
voluntary) risk disclosure was the same across both manual and automated methods. We therefore 
concluded that our computed disclosure scores were both reliable and valid. 
Market liquidity. Consistent with Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Miihkinen (2013), we 
measured market liquidity or information asymmetry by calculating the average of the relative 
spreads over a three-month period, from the beginning of May to the end of July. We chose this 
period to ensure that the financial reporting would be publicly available to users, since financial 
reporting is required to be available by the beginning of May, four months after fiscal year end 
(i.e., end of December). We calculated the three-month mean of the relative spreads by dividing 
the difference between the daily ask and bid prices by the average of the daily ask and bid prices.  
Corporate governance. Corporate governance variables were collected manually and 
included so that we could study their impact on risk disclosure. These variables were as follows: 
board size, measured by the log of the total number of board directors; non-executive directors, 
the proportion of non-executive directors, relative to the board size; independent non-executive 
directors, the proportion of independent non-executive directors, relative to the board size; the 
dividend yield, as the log of the ratio of the most recent full-year dividends to the current share 
price; CEO duality, measured as a dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO is also chairman of the 
board of directors and 0 otherwise; concentrated ownership structure, captured by closely held 
shares, proxied by the log of the percentage of shares owned by firm insiders (e.g., shares held by 
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officers, directors and their families, or by any individual holding 5% or more of the outstanding 
shares); audit quality, a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the external auditor is one of the “big four” 
and 0 otherwise.  
Control variables. We controlled for a number of different possible determinants selected 
on the basis of prior research. Those determinants broadly reflect firm-specific incentives. 
Specifically, we controlled for firm size since the signaling theory suggests that larger firms have 
larger analyst followings and hence are better able to distribute firm information. Further, these 
firms are likely to be able to provide this information to the users of annual report narratives at a 
reasonable cost. The prior risk reporting literature either finds no significant impact of firm size 
on the quantity and/or quality of risk disclosure, as in Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), finds a negative 
relation as in Campbell et al. (2014), or finds a positive impact on aggregated disclosure, as in 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Abraham and Cox (2007). Firm size was measured as the log of 
total assets. We also accounted for firm growth, as an extensive and credible disclosure policy will 
serve to improve a firm’s ability to fund its growth opportunities. High-growth firms are likely to 
have greater information asymmetry and higher agency costs (Gaver & Gaver, 1993). In the 
context of risk reporting, Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2013) hypothesize such a positive 
association but their findings do not support such a prediction. We measured firm growth as the 
log of the ratio of the difference between earnings in the years t1 and t0 to earnings in the year t0. 
We also controlled for firm profitability and liquidity. Arguably, the managers of firms with 
higher returns are more likely than other firms to be highly motivated to signal this information to 
the market (e.g., Chavent et al., 2006). Firm profitability was measured as the log of the return on 
equity (ROE). Eng and Mak (2003) argue that companies with higher liquidity are likely to be more 
transparent in their annual reports and on their websites regarding their corporate governance 
mechanisms. Marshall and Weetman (2007) find that highly liquid US and UK firms are likely to 
provide higher levels of information concerning foreign exchange risk management. Firm liquidity 
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was thus measured in this study as the log of the ratio of total current assets to total current 
liabilities. 
We also controlled for firm risk and capital structure. Relatively high-risk firms may disclose 
more risk information to meet their investors’ requirements for more information about risk 
drivers and the methods that the firms use to evaluate and address their risks. Elshandidy, Fraser, 
and Hussainey (2013) find, in line with Deumes (2008), that risky firms have higher incentives than 
less risky firms to exhibit risk information voluntarily to avoid misinterpretations by market 
participants. We measured firm risk by the beta, which is the covariance of a firm’s market return 
relative to a market index. This calculation was based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month-
end firm prices, relative to the market returns of the FTSE All Share in the UK, and the FTSE 
MIB in Italy. While some studies (e.g., Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 
2013) have found that firm leverage positively and significantly influences the level of risk 
information firms provide in their narratives, some other studies (Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011; 
Miihkinen, 2012) have reported a negative association between leverage and risk disclosure. Firm 
capital structure was measured by the log of leverage, proxied by the ratio of total debt to total 
equity. 
Following Campbell et al. (2014), we also controlled for book-to-market value (BTM), which 
can affect a firm’s stock returns either positively or negatively depending on how market 
participants associate a high or low BTM with a firm’s future growth. BTM is measured as the 
book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Lastly, and consistent with Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000), we controlled for share price volatility, which we expected to be positively 
associated with the relative spread, and the trading volume, which we expected to be negatively 
associated with the relative spread. The share price volatility was measured by the standard 
deviation of  daily stock prices (adjusted). The trading volume was measured by dividing the daily 
trading volume, that is, the number of  shares traded on day i, by the number of  outstanding shares. 
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Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the UK and Italian firms. The t-test results suggest 
that there are significant differences in the risk disclosure, corporate governance and market 
indicator variables between the two countries. The differences for risk disclosure indicate that UK 
firms tend, on average, to exhibit more (less) risk information voluntarily (mandatorily) than Italian 
firms do. When we consider the differences between disclosure types within each country, our 
results confirm that UK (Italian) firms tend to provide, on average, 61% (10%) more voluntary 
than mandatory risk disclosure. These observed variations in these variables reflect the different 
environmental factors in the two countries, which may affect firms’ decisions over whether to 
reveal or withhold information about their risk.6 
Our findings are consistent with the prior literature on cross-country differences, both in 
general disclosure practices (Cooke & Wallace, 1990; Ball, Kothari, & Ashok, 2000; Nobes & 
Parker, 2010) and in terms of risk disclosure in particular (Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011). Such 
differences can be interpreted in light of the underlying institutional background of these two 
countries, which reflects the contradictory cultures that exist in Europe and their economic and 
regulatory milieus (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Nobes, 1998; Moscariello, 
Skerratt, & Pizzo, 2014). 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
     Panels A and B of Table 2 provide the correlation matrices for the UK and Italy, respectively. 
The correlation coefficients between the mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure scores in each 
country indicate that firms with a higher propensity to comply with the risk regulations (reflected 
by the mandatory score) are also likely to provide higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure than 
other firms. This result also suggests that firms tend to maximize (positive associations, as in Dye, 
1986) rather than optimize (negative associations, as in Dye, 1990) their levels of risk disclosure 
for both mandatory and voluntary forms of disclosure. Specifically, this positive association 
between mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure supports the view that firms are likely to use the 
two forms of disclosure in a complementary fashion rather than as substitutes for each other, as 
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has been suggested by some of the prior literature (e.g., Marshall & Weetman, 2002; Elshandidy, 
Fraser, & Hussainey, 2013). The correlation matrix also suggests that both the mandatory and 
voluntary risk disclosure scores are more significantly associated with most of the independent and 
control variables in the UK than in Italy.7  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Empirical Model 
The impact of corporate governance factors on risk disclosure practices. We used 
fixed (Eq. 1) and random (Eq. 2) effects models to regress the corporate governance variables, 
controlling for the six firm characteristics, on the risk disclosure scores (both mandatory and 
voluntary scores, in separate regressions). 
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Eq. 2 
Eq. 1 shows the fixed effects model that accounts for any changes in risk disclosure as a 
result of changes in corporate governance over the five-year period. Additionally, the model 
accounts for any bias in risk disclosure caused by firm and/or industry-specific effects. The fixed 
effects model eliminates the effects of time-invariant characteristics from the regressor variables. 
β1 and β2 are the slopes for the corporate governance and control variables, respectively. α i is the 
intercept for firm i, while µit is the error term for firm i in year t.  
Eq. 2 shows the random effects model that accounts for the bias in risk disclosure caused 
by random variations across firms, in the UK and in Italy and across industries, over the five-year 
period under analysis. All variables are the same as in Eq. 1. Additionally, the error term is 
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broadened from µit, which captures the between-firm error, to include εit, which captures the 
within-firm error.  
The impact of risk disclosure practices on market liquidity. To observe whether risk 
disclosure practices are useful or not, we also examined the extent to which mandatory and 
voluntary risk disclosure influence a firm’s market liquidity. To that end, similarly to Kravet and 
Muslu (2013) and Campbell et al. (2014), we used the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach, 
controlling for both industry and year fixed effects, and also correcting the standard error for any 
heteroskedastic bias.8 
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Eq. 3 
In Eq. 3 market liquidity is measured as the average of the relative spreads over a three-month 
period, from the beginning of May to the end of July, the time period having been chosen because 
it is four months after fiscal year end for the reasons stated earlier. In the specification, we thus 
excluded all firms whose fiscal year end was different from 31 December, that is 57(2) firms, from 
our UK (Italian) list. All other variables remained the same as those in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2. We also 
used the BTM ratio, the share price volatility and the trading volume, as control variables. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Impact of Corporate Governance Factors on Risk Disclosure Practices 
Voluntary risk disclosure. Model 1 in Table 3 shows the results for the UK firms’ 
voluntary risk disclosure scores. They show that large boards of directors and high proportions of 
non-executive directors lead to the provision of more voluntary risk information (the t-statistics 
2.751 and 4.301 at the 1% level, respectively). These results are consistent with our expectation 
based on agency theory and the prior empirical research (e.g., Abraham & Cox, 2007). As suggested 
by agency theory, a higher proportion of non-executive directors mitigates the conflict between 
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the managers and owners by increasing transparency (see e.g., Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008), thus 
leading to a decrease in the information asymmetry between the management and the shareholders 
and also in the cost of monitoring.  
Model 1 of Table 3 also suggests that the dividend policies of UK firms have a significant 
impact on the amount of risk information these firms provide voluntarily; firms with lower 
dividend yields are likely to provide significantly higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure than 
other firms (t-statistic -2.792 at 1%). This result is consistent with the prior research (e.g., 
Hussainey & Walker, 2009). The findings support our hypotheses 1, 2a and 4. 
These results are also consistent with the ICAEW (1997, 1999a, 2002)9, which argues that a 
board of directors can integrate information taken from their internal reports regarding risk, 
including information about risk types and risk management, with other information found in 
external reports. The results can also be interpreted as relating to the UK’s general expectation for 
good corporate governance and a high level of investor protection (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000, 2002). Directors are expected to play a fundamental role in 
mitigating the conflict between management and stakeholder aims by increasing the level of 
transparency, which as mentioned helps to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. In 
general terms, good corporate governance can play an effective role in reallocating risk information 
between insiders (management) and outsiders (shareholders), which may help to achieve a fairer 
distribution of welfare for market participants.  
In terms of our control variables in the same model, the results show, in line with prior 
literature such as Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2013), that bigger firms are likely to provide 
significantly more voluntary risk information. This is likely because such firms are better able to 
prepare and integrate information for their investors, including risk information. 
In summary, the above results collectively indicate that corporate governance mechanisms 
mostly dominate firm characteristics in explaining why UK firms voluntarily disclose risk 
information in their annual report narratives. 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Corporate Governance: An International Review, which has been published in 
final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12095/abstract]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in 
accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
25 
 
--------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
For Italy, we relied on the random effects model in lieu of the fixed effects model, since the 
Hausman test confirmed the null hypothesis that the error term did not correlate with the 
regressors. Model 2 of Table 3 suggests that corporate governance does not stimulate Italian firms 
to voluntarily provide risk information in their narratives. This result suggests that, 
notwithstanding the differences in the corporate governance variables across Italian industries as 
reported under footnote 6 (which were based on the one-way analysis of variance; ANOVA), these 
differences appear not to be statistically associated with the levels of voluntary risk disclosure. 
These results, therefore, do not support any of our hypotheses. 
Turning to the control variables or firm characteristics, we find that Italian firms with lower 
levels of liquidity are likely to provide significantly higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure (t-
statistic -3.273 at the 1% level). This result is in line with Marshall and Weetman’s (2007) and 
Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey’s (2013) theoretical arguments suggesting that firms with higher 
levels of liquidity risk are likely to provide more risk information to their investors than other 
firms. 
Therefore, firm characteristics (incentives) have a higher impact than corporate governance 
(regulations) on the amount of voluntary risk information provided to the Italian stock market. 
Our conclusion here is in line with Dobler’s (2008) argument, which emphasizes the importance 
of studying the incentives that motivate firms to provide risk information in their narratives. We 
might also interpret this result as demonstrating that the corporate governance environment in 
Italy has not developed to a level sufficient to encourage Italian firms to voluntarily provide more 
risk information, since doing so does not reduce agency costs. This result emphasizes the limited 
role currently played by corporate governance in Italy in stimulating managers to provide more 
meaningful information about their risk processes. In turn, this result may also suggest that further 
steps should be taken by the Italian regulators to improve the corporate governance mechanisms 
in the country. 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Corporate Governance: An International Review, which has been published in 
final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12095/abstract]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in 
accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
26 
 
Mandatory risk disclosure. For the UK, Model 3 of Table 3 shows that the coefficient for 
audit quality is negative (t-statistic -2.058 at the 5% level). This result suggests that firms whose 
annual reports are audited by an auditor other than one of the “big four” are likely to convey 
significantly more mandatory risk information than other firms. It appears that smaller auditors 
are likely to pay greater attention to the risk regulations than larger auditors, probably to avoid the 
costs of non-compliance. This result, however, does appear to be consistent with Campbell et al.’s 
(2014) argument that hiring one of the “big four” is likely to be associated with high audit quality 
and, therefore, less exposure to risk and uncertainty. Based on that argument, UK firms’ 
motivation to reveal more risk information is likely to be high due to the increased risk and 
uncertainty likely to be associated with a non-“big four” auditor.  
Table 3 also indicates that firms with lower growth, those that are less profitable, and those 
that are more risky (t-statistics -1.780, -1.918 and -1.675, respectively, at the 10% level) are likely 
to exhibit higher levels of mandatory risk disclosure than other firms, likely because they want to 
reassure their investors of their ability to generate potential market opportunities and to provide 
more details on how they manage their risks (e.g., Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Hussainey & Walker, 
2009; Elshandidy, Fraser, & Husssainey, 2013). Within the UK, our conclusions suggest that, 
similarly to the case of Italy’s voluntary risk disclosure, the incentive seems to dominate the role 
of corporate governance in motivating firms to comply with the risk disclosure regulations.  
For Italy, as shown in Model 4 of Table 3, the amount of mandatory risk information 
disclosed is likely to be influenced significantly by board size, the proportion of non-executive 
directors, and audit quality (t-statistics 1.886, at the 10% level, and 2.843 and -2.827, at the 1% 
level, respectively). Another board characteristic, that of the combined role of chairman and CEO, 
also leads firms to comply more strongly with the risk regulations (t-statistic 3.289 at the 1% level). 
While this result is inconsistent with agency theory, according to which the combining of these 
roles signals a high probability that the chairman/CEO will act in his or her own self-interest rather 
than in the shareholders’ interests, it is consistent with other arguments suggesting that duality may 
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have some benefits (e.g., Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997), although the latter’s evidence suggests 
that the costs of separation are generally larger than its benefits. The benefits posited include being 
in a good position to make relevant and timely decisions. It seems, according to our findings, that 
corporate governance motivates the managers of Italian firms to comply well with risk regulations. 
These results support hypotheses 1, 2a, 3, and 6. 
Looking at the control variables, bigger, less liquid and more risky firms are likely to exhibit 
higher levels of compliance with the Italian risk regulations than other firms. These three results 
are very similar to some of our results discussed earlier.10 
Additional tests for good governance. The private information that managers have about 
an entity leads to the issue of moral hazard (Bushman & Smith, 2001). Managers favor using private 
information for their own ends by choosing what they will disclose to market participants and 
regulators (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). Since it may not be possible for market participants to observe 
the management’s actions and credibility directly, they may have to assess the quality of a firm’s 
risk reporting on the basis of the mechanisms of corporate governance that are in place, and the 
management and monitoring of those mechanisms. 
It has long been held that healthy corporate governance refers to a positive process of risk 
management (e.g., ICAEW, 1999a). Effective risk management and supply management using 
high-quality data and tools are required to predict risks and reduce (unintentional) errors to a 
minimum. One of the many empirical papers that has examined the role of corporate governance 
(Brown & Caylor, 2006) examines the relationships between corporate governance, firm valuation 
and firm risk. The authors conclude that firms with poor governance have lower valuations, higher 
risk and a higher degree of stock price volatility. 
As some of the prior research (e.g., Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard, 2009) suggests, strong 
governance can be indicated by board independence. Thus, we classify firms into strong and weak 
governance groups, depending on whether the proportion of independent non-executive directors 
is greater or less than the median.  
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The fixed effects estimations shown as Model 1 of Table 4 suggest that strongly governed 
UK firms are likely to provide significantly high levels of risk information voluntarily in their 
annual report narratives. Meanwhile, only audit quality and firm size significantly influence weakly 
governed firms’ voluntary risk disclosure, as shown in Model 5. According to the same comparison 
for Italian firms, we can observe that strongly (weakly) governed firms, shown under Model 2 (6) 
using random effects estimations, are likely to exhibit voluntary risk disclosure as a response to 
their liquidity (growth) incentives rather than as a response to governance factors, with the 
exception of the dividend yield for weakly governed firms. Model 4 of Table 4 shows that, for 
Italy, compliance with Italian risk regulations is highly influenced by governance factors (i.e., board 
size, CEO duality, and audit quality) rather than by incentives (with the exception of liquidity). In 
the UK, on the contrary, as shown by Models 3 and 7 of Table 4, compliance with risk regulations 
is likely to be influenced more by incentives than by governance. 
To sum up, the main conclusions drawn based on Table 3 indicate that governance 
(incentives) factors influence UK firms’ decision to reveal or conceal voluntary (mandatory) risk 
information. Contrary to those findings, incentive (governance) factors influence Italian firms’ 
decision to reveal voluntary (mandatory) information in the narrative sections of their annual 
reports. Distinguishing between firms with strong and weak governance, as shown in Table 4, our 
findings appear to be driven mostly by strongly governed firms, in terms of the factors that affect 
mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure in both the UK and Italy.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
The Impact of Risk Disclosure Practices on Market Liquidity  
Models 1 and 2 of Table 5, which exhibit standardized coefficients on all explanatory variables so 
as to compare the effect of mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure on market liquidity within and 
between the UK and Italy, show that, for UK firms, providing more risk information, whether 
voluntarily or mandatorily, increases their market liquidity, as observed by the relative bid-ask 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Corporate Governance: An International Review, which has been published in 
final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12095/abstract]. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in 
accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
29 
 
spread (t-statistics -5.995 and -4.546 at the 1% level). Investors in those firms that provide high 
levels of risk information either voluntarily or mandatorily are likely to be more confident of a 
stock transaction occurring at its fairest price, which will increase the stock liquidity of those firms. 
Among all UK firms, as shown in Models 1 and 2, voluntary risk disclosure is likely to be 53% ([1-
0.196/0.128]*100) more effective than mandatory risk disclosure in influencing the market 
liquidity.  
Our results suggest that firms will have high incentives to disclose more information so as 
to better inform their investors; by eliminating the information asymmetry problem, this will 
decrease agency costs by aligning any conflicts of interests that may exist between different parties. 
Our results are consistent with the theoretical research, which argues that the disclosure of a large 
amount of information is likely to reduce the information asymmetries between non-informed or 
less informed investors and informed investors (e.g., Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). Our result is 
also consistent with the recent empirical evidence on risk disclosure presented in Miihkinen (2013) 
and Campbell et al. (2014). 
While Model 3 of Table 5 indicates that voluntary risk disclosure is likely to significantly (t-
statistic 2.261) increase market liquidity, Model 4 of the same table indicates that mandatory risk 
disclosure does not affect market liquidity. Italian firms, as was shown in Table 1, are likely to 
provide more risk information voluntarily than they do mandatorily, as a response to those firms’ 
managers’ incentives, as was shown in Table 3 and then confirmed in Table 4. Our results shown 
in Table 5 (Models 3 and 4) suggest that investors in the Italian market are more likely to be 
incorporating the voluntary than the mandatory disclosure information, which tends to be more 
generic or less informative, into their stock price decisions. These results confirm those in recent 
empirical research on general disclosure; for instance, Cheung, Jiang, and Tan (2010) find that 
voluntary rather than mandatory disclosure information is likely to influence market valuations. 
Our result also confirms Miihkinen’s (2012) argument that, in some contexts, additional 
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regulations on risk disclosure might turn such disclosure into a boilerplate format, since most of 
the information will be irrelevant to investors.  
Given that Italian firms tend to complain more about risk regulations than UK firms, as 
shown in Table 1, such disclosure is likely to be vague and more generic. The Italian firms appear 
to fill out forms that do not convey particularly useful information to investors. These firms may 
also fear investors’ responses, especially if they feel that the latter will perceive more risk 
information as a bad signal.11  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------- 
When we distinguish between strongly and weakly governed firms in both countries, we find 
that, in the UK, both strongly (Models 5 and 6) and weakly (Models 9 and 10) governed firms are 
likely to provide useful risk information (t-statistics 5.408, 3.548, 3.103 and 3.313, all at the 1% 
level). However, Italian firms with strong governance (Models 7 and 8) tend to provide more 
informative voluntary and less informative mandatory risk disclosure. Weakly governed Italian 
firms (Models 11 and 12) do not provide significantly useful risk information either voluntarily or 
mandatorily.  
Comparing the standardized coefficients on mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure across 
strongly and weakly governed firms in both countries, it is notable that our results for all firms are 
driven mostly by the strongly governed firms. For example, in Models 11 and 12 weakly governed 
firms are shown to be more likely to provide generic or boilerplate information, while strongly 
governed firms are likely to provide more risk-specific information. The latter will reduce the 
information asymmetry between the market participants, as evidenced through the bid-ask spread. 
For the UK, it appears that the significant impact of voluntary risk disclosure on liquidity is likely 
to be more pronounced among strongly than weakly governed firms, as the impact of voluntary 
risk disclosure is 30% more (0.225/0.174) effective for strongly than weakly governed firms. These 
results support hypothesis 7. 
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Our results have both theoretical and practical implications. First, they show that the quality 
of corporate governance is an important factor to consider when studying the impact of risk 
disclosure on market liquidity. Our main conclusions under Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 are mostly driven 
by firms that have strong governance (as shown in Models 5, 6, 7 and 8). Second, our results 
further confirm the importance of improving corporate governance factors in Italy so as to 
stimulate firms to provide more meaningful risk information.  
Robustness Checks 
Without making any distinction between voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure, Table 6 Panel 
A shows the factors that motivate UK and Italian firms to provide risk disclosure in general, and 
how those factors work among strongly and weakly governed firms. Panel B of the same table 
explains the impact of such aggregate disclosure on market liquidity for all, strongly governed, and 
weakly governed firms. Generally, we find that the aggregate risk disclosure drivers in the UK 
(Italy) are likely to be consistent with those associated with voluntary (mandatory) rather than 
mandatory (voluntary) risk disclosure, which were shown in Table 3. These results confirm our 
argument that it is quite difficult to draw general conclusions in terms of the incentives for 
mandatory and/or voluntary risk disclosure based on aggregate risk disclosure since the two types 
of disclosure have different drivers. 
The results shown in Panel B of Table 6 suggest that in all (Model 1), strongly governed 
(Model 3) and weakly governed (Model 5) UK firms, aggregate risk disclosure is likely to 
significantly increase market liquidity by reducing information asymmetry. In the same panel, the 
results for Italian firms show a significant impact of aggregate risk disclosure for all firms, for 
strongly governed firms, but not for weakly governed firms. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------- 
To observe how both UK and Italian firms behaved during the recent financial crisis, the 
period under analysis was divided into three: prior to the crisis (years 2005, 2006 and 2007), during 
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the crisis (2008) and after the crisis (2009). Each was introduced as a dummy variable. Models 1 
and 3 of Table 7 explain that, while UK firms were likely to exhibit significantly more risk 
information voluntarily both during and after the crisis relative to prior to the crisis, the effect of 
the crisis on mandated risk information was only statistically apparent during the crisis. However, 
Models 2 and 4 document that the financial crisis caused Italian firms to comply significantly more 
with the risk regulations and reveal significantly more risk information voluntarily both during and 
after the crisis than those firms had tended to exhibit prior to the crisis. These results are consistent 
with the most recent literature on risk reporting (e.g., Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2014; 
Miihkinen, 2013), which finds that the investors’ risk information needs are higher during and after 
the crisis. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------- 
      We also checked the issue of endogeneity since it has been argued to be a common problem 
in corporate governance research (e.g., Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007). Using fixed effects 
models is seen as one method of dealing with the problem of endogeneity, as it eliminates the 
influence of time-invariant unobservable variables (e.g., Brown, Beekes, & Verhoeven, 2011). As 
a result of our use of the fixed effects model, the remaining associations cannot be attributed to 
any endogeneity related to our dataset. We also implemented instrumental variables as this is the 
most common approach used for detecting and mitigating an endogeneity problem (e.g., Larcker, 
Richardson, & Tuna, 2007). Accordingly, we extended our models by performing a lag analysis 
(Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard, 2009), regressing the current year’s mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosure scores on the previous year’s board characteristics, ownership structure, dividend policy 
and audit quality. 
To validate the composition of the sub-sample used for the lag analysis, we first tested 
whether our previous voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure results using contemporaneous 
governance variables held true in the lagged case. We found similar results in the lagged case to 
those reported in Table 3. Further, we estimated the model using the lagged governance variables 
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after distinguishing between strongly and weakly governed firms. Consistent with the Table 4 
results, this analysis provides evidence that stronger corporate governance does lead to more 
effective risk disclosure. 
We also validated our disclosure scores by changing the unit of analysis to the number of 
words (as in Miihkinen, 2012 and in Campbell et al., 2014) instead of the number of sentences (as 
used in our main analysis and in Kravet & Muslu, 2013) for the year 2008. The new variables are 
dependent variables when examining the impact of corporate governance and independent 
variables when examining their impact on market liquidity. The results, omitted for brevity, 
supported our main conclusions drawn from Tables 3 and 5. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper examines how corporate governance influences risk disclosure practices for non-
financial firms in the UK and Italy over a five-year period. Our findings support the significant 
role of corporate governance in motivating UK firms to exhibit higher levels of voluntary than 
mandatory risk disclosure in the narrative sections of their annual reports. In contrast, our findings 
show that corporate governance motivates Italian firms to provide more risk information 
mandatorily than voluntarily, likely due to the incentives of firms’ managers regarding the inclusion 
of voluntary risk information in their narratives, confirming Melis’s (2000) findings on the Italian 
corporate governance system. Drawing a distinction between strongly and weakly governed firms 
shows that our findings regarding those factors that affect voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure 
appear to be driven more by strongly governed firms, in both countries.  
This paper also investigates the impact of risk disclosure practices on market liquidity. We 
find that UK firms are likely to reveal meaningful risk information, which describes a firm’s specific 
conditions and leads investors to better incorporate the information into their price decisions. This 
in turn improves market liquidity as information asymmetry decreases. We draw the same 
conclusion for both strong and weak corporate governance firms in the UK. In Italy, we find that 
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voluntary rather than mandatory risk disclosure significantly improves market liquidity. This 
conclusion could be reached for strongly but not for weakly governed firms. Our results suggest 
that, while voluntary risk disclosure seems to be informative to investors, mandatory risk disclosure 
is seen as generic or boilerplate. 
Our results have several implications for regulators and investors in both the UK and Italy. 
They support the UK’s regulatory trend regarding risk disclosure, which emphasizes directors’ role 
in facilitating the process of revealing more risk information and the encouragement rather than 
mandating of risk disclosure. However, the results signal a need for further improvements in the 
Italian context. Our findings rationalize the debate over the impact improved corporate 
governance has on disclosure practices, in general, and within the Italian context in particular. The 
logic of this rationalization may lead policymakers to encourage firms to implement corporate 
governance so as to improve the informational content of their financial reporting. 
Investors may also find these results useful, since they provide empirical evidence that 
corporate governance attributes (e.g., board size, executive directors) do influence managers 
differently in terms of the risk information they reveal. Investors, therefore, might do well to rely 
on such attributes (e.g., a large board size and a high proportion of non-executive directors) to 
form their own expectations about the risk information that is revealed, either voluntarily and/or 
mandatorily. Our findings support the view that disclosing risk information in the narrative 
sections of annual reports is seen as more credible in the UK than in Italy, as such information is 
likely to be more closely related to investors’ price decisions in the UK than in Italy.  
Our analyses are limited by the following details: (1) including more countries when 
investigating the impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure practices would allow country 
characteristics to be included; thus, future research could observe how these variables empirically 
explain the variation in risk disclosure practices across different countries; (2) looking at the quality 
rather than the quantity of risk disclosure in further investigations will allow researchers to observe 
whether there are differences between the results driven by quantity- versus quality-based research 
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when measuring disclosure generally (e.g., Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004) and risk disclosure 
in particular (e.g., Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Miihkinen, 2012); (3) looking at other outlets of 
corporate communication (e.g., Li, 2010b), such as online resources, conference calls and/or 
financial analysts’ reports, might be an avenue for future research, helping to answer questions 
such as how governance affects risk disclosure through different outlets and whether certain 
governance characteristics are more strongly associated with some outlets than others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
1  Notably, the Companies Act 2006 identifies certain requirements regarding directors’ duties (e.g., enhancing 
shareholder value), shareholders’ rights (e.g., voting, pre-emption rights) and disclosure requirements (e.g., directors’ 
remuneration). 
2 The EU’s Transparency Directive of 2004 (Directive 2004/109/EC) stated that only public companies should 
include information about the principal risks and uncertainties they might face in their interim management report 
(Article 5 (4)).  
3  In 2010 the IASB issued the IFRS practice statement, Management Commentary, which contained some 
requirements regarding risk disclosure. Those requirements do not affect our paper since the effective date of this 
non-mandatory statement is later than the end of our sample period. The statement maintained (IASB, 2010:13) that 
“management should disclose its principal strategic, commercial, operational and financial risks, which are those that may significantly affect 
the entity’s strategies and progress of the entity’s value. The description of the principal risks facing the entity should cover both exposures 
to negative consequences and potential opportunities. Management commentary provides useful information when it discusses the principal 
risks and uncertainties necessary to understand management’s objectives and strategies for the entity”. 
4 It is worthy of mentioning that we have relied on the same logic as ICAEW (1997, Section 3, p.p. 16-26 and 2011, 
appendix 1, p.p. 47-49) when analyzing the accounting standards related to risk disclosure. Furthermore, and 
consistent with Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey (2013) and Kravet and Muslu (2013), our decision on whether or 
not a word should be included in our final risk word list was based on the following: it had to appear at least once in 
an initial textual search of 30 annual reports in each country that were selected randomly from the year 2007. 
5 Our main descriptive statistics for the voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure scores based on automated and 
manual content analysis for each country indicate that, on average, the manual and automated disclosure scores were 
similar. However, the manual disclosure scores were less homogeneous, as indicated by the standard deviation.  
6 Our results based on ANOVA analysis, not reported, showed that, even within each country, firms were likely to 
differ in their risk disclosure policies between years (longitudinally) and across different industries. Those industries 
were basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, health care, industrials, technology, telecommunication and 
utilities. The result shows the importance of considering the influence of industry (e.g., Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004) 
when examining risk disclosure levels. These unreported results are available upon request from the corresponding 
(principal) author. 
7 Examining each of these pairs of correlation coefficients confirms that multicollinearity is unlikely to exist with these 
variables, as the majority of the coefficients are relatively low. The only exception to this rule is the correlation between 
the two risk disclosure scores, especially in the case of the UK firms. We further calculated the variance inflation 
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factors (VIFs), and found that all values were less than 3. Thus, we concluded that multicollinearity does not pose a 
problem for our regression model. 
8 We assessed whether panel regression was the best way to estimate how risk disclosure influences market liquidity, 
using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier, which produced a small chi-squared value, indicating a failure to reject 
the null hypothesis of no panel effects and suggesting that OLS would be preferable (Wooldridge, 2010). 
9 The ICAEW (2002:9) states that “directors should communicate clearly what actions they are taking to manage these risks, providing 
sufficient information to allow investors to make a judgement about the risks being undertaken by the company”.  
10  The significance of the association between mandatory or voluntary risk disclosure  
and non-executive or independent non-executive directors varies from the correlation matrix (Table 2) to the 
regression models (Table 3). This could be because the correlation matrix, as a bivariate analysis method, gives just 
the significance of the association between each pair of variables (i.e., mandatory or voluntary and one factor of 
corporate governance such as non-executive directors) in isolation of any potential impact of other corporate 
governance factors. Meanwhile, in multiple regression analysis, as a multivariate analysis method, the associations 
between either mandatory or voluntary risk disclosure and the combination of all the explanatory variables (i.e., 
including non-executive directors and independent non-executive directors) are observed simultaneously. Thus, the 
significances of the impacts of board characteristics on risk disclosure practices are subject to whether we are 
considering those characteristics individually or combined. 
11 In further tests, we ran all of our analyses combining both voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure for two reasons: 
to control for the voluntary (mandatory) while observing the impact of mandatory (voluntary) risk disclosure on 
market liquidity, and because a firm might choose to engage with both forms of disclosure. Our unreported results, 
available upon request from the corresponding (principal) author, suggest that UK and Italian firms tend to disclose 
firm-specific information through voluntary rather than mandatory risk disclosure, which is what affects the investors’ 
price decisions that can then improve market liquidity. Our conclusion, based on all firms, is likely to be driven more 
by strongly than weakly governed firms.  
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